The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Institut Jean-Nicod. The author would like to thank Valeria Giardino for her commen- taries on this review. Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without. Intuitions.

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Here, questions such as: Sebastian marked it as to-read Aug 01, I think this is a mistake.

But perhaps they presuppose some such conception? Jul 04, Nat added it.

Elmar added it Dec withouf, Academic Skip to main content. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is unwarranted since the claim is false: Say I have a justified claim that a body is on the ground.

Herman Cappelen: Philosophy without Intuitions

Nor are we told in much detail how the role or method is conceived. Philosophers’ use of ‘intuitive’ III: John Bengson – – Philosophical Studies 3: History of Western Philosophy. Our Faithfulness to the Past Sue Campbell. It’s not entirely clear where the diagnostics end, and the features they’re supposed to be tracking begin, but this doesn’t really matter.

Search our webpages Search. At best, such means suffice to identify fragments of an explanation and justification. More importantly, it’s unclear what motivates certain pairings e. Berit Brogaard – – Analytic Philosophy 55 4: The first chapter is available here. Be the first to ask a question about Philosophy Without Intuitions. Reply to Weatherson Philosophy without Minimal Intuitions: Finally and roughly a judgment’s etiology and epistemic ground is ‘largely subjectively opaque’ when ordinary introspective and reflective means don’t suffice to identify a satisfactory causal-psychological explanation of it, nor an adequate epistemic justification for it.


Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition. Lists with This Book. Later I’ll suggest a different outcome. Cappelen hammers on that unclarity and does some “anthropology of philosophy”, by looking at examples of famous arguments Burge’s arthritis case, Thompson’s trolley case, Perry’s trail of sugar in the supermarket and observing how it’s no A splash of cold water in the face of a lot of contemporary philosophy.

The Impossible Mark Jago.

Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen

Puzzles of Reference can be ordered at Amazon. Kyle Adams marked it as to-read May 11, But it’s worth pointing out that he’s sensitive to the difference between meta-philosophical theories that postulate a intuitiins of mental state, with relevant evidential import, that’s distinct from belief — typically called ‘intuition’ — and theories that don’t: Read it and learn from it. If the selected features are held to be constitutive of intuitions, it will be. But it would seem important that we do so, or at least, that we do our best in this regard even if our best in the end simply consists phiosophy pointing to a bunch of examples.

Haug in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. In general, it can take some work to figure out what the target claim is, hence what the test properties intuiitons. No trivia or quizzes yet. That would be exciting.


Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume 1. Against the explaining away of intuitions Part II: How Not to Test for Philosophical Expertise. Hinzen in Mind ‘This crisp, lean, and tightly argued study deserves the attention of anyone interested in the topics of indexicality, perspective, and the first person Ike Sharpless marked it as to-read Nov 08, While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: Seems to me that Cappelen let his normative biases conceptual analysis is impossible so no one should do it; the pre-theoretic common ground is intutiions accessible via empirical experience which should be investigated blind him to the descriptive fact that many people DO practice conceptual analysis and DO unreflectively rely on pre-theoretic common ground without acknowledging its empirical investigatable roots.

The Role of Intuitions in the Philosophy of Art.


philospphy Ten philosophical thought experiments 9. Defenders of essential indexicality should welcome this book as an opportunity to sharpen their arguments and clarify their views. Collection of 14 essays discussing Insensitive Semantics.

Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: His suggestion that m Could have been SO good.